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We hold that when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and 
the Constitution does not insulate them from discipline. 
- Justice Anthony Kennedy in Garcetti v. Ceballos.1 
The American people are the only ones who lose if 
government employees are silenced, because only a 
corrupt government gains from that, and the five Justices 
who took an oath to protect the Constitution of the United 
                                                           
ǂ David L. Hudson Jr. is a First Amendment Fellow with the Freedom Forum Institute and a 
Justice Robert H. Jackson Fellow with the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education. 
He also serves as an assistant professor of law at Belmont University College of Law. The 
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the manuscript.  
1 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).   
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States for the citizens of the country were the ones who 
were now violating their oath.  
- Michale Callahan.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has had its share of shameful 
rulings.3 The great Erwin Chemerinsky wrote that we should “appreciate the 
powerful case against the Supreme Court for the choices it has made 
throughout history.”4 Another scholar wrote that the “list is so long, so 
infamous, and so disturbingly regular—recurring consistently over time—that 
one must seriously question whether the Supreme Court has been, on 
balance, a positive or negative force in our nation’s constitutional history.”5   
Many of these horrible rulings are well known. For example, the 
Court permitted slavery with its wretched decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,6 legalized segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson,7 and supported the 
internment of 110,000 Japanese-American citizens in Korematsu v. United 
States.8 These three decisions reek of abject racism and have been 
condemned in the annals of history.9    
                                                           
2 MICHALE CALLAHAN, TOO POLITICALLY SENSITIVE 351 (2009).   
3 JOEL D. JOSEPH, BLACK MONDAYS: WORST DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 21 
(1990).   
4 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 342 (2015).   
5 Michael S. Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 995, 1001 (2003).   
6 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 106 
(1993) (calling the Dred Scott decision a “judicial blunder”).    
7 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 35 (“The most important 
such case was Plessy v. Ferguson, in 1896. It, too, is widely regarded as one of the Supreme 
Court’s worst decisions.”). 
8 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 57 (“Korematsu is deeply 
objectionable because the government used ethnicity alone as the basis for predicting who 
was a threat to national security and who would remain free.”).  
9 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 
DRAKE L. REV. 795, 797 (2006) (“For most of U.S. history the Supreme Court has supported 
and reinforced racial discrimination against non-whites.”); see also Maureen Johnson, 
Separate But (Un)Equal: Why Institutionalized Anti-Racism is Never the Answer to the 
Never-ending Cycle of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, 327 (2018) (“For 
decades, Plessy v. Ferguson has been identified as one of the worst decisions ever handed 
down by the Supreme Court.”); Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context for an 
Old Case, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV. 141, 141 (2007) (“Almost everyone despises Dred Scott.”); 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Success, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 1019, 1020 (2018) (listing Plessy and Korematsu—along with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 
200 (1927)—as three of the Court’s worst decisions). 
2
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However, another decision of a more recent vintage deserves its 
rightful place in the Court’s hall of shame: Garcetti v. Ceballos.10 In Garcetti, 
the Court issued a decision that serves as a Dred Scott-type ruling for public 
employees, diminishing their free speech rights to an unacceptable level. 
The Court created a categorical rule that public employees have no free 
speech rights when engaged in official, job-related speech.11 
Under Garcetti, it does not matter how valuable an employee’s 
speech is, how much corruption that speech exposes, or whether the speech 
informs the public regarding an important issue. Instead, the five-justice 
majority focused solely on creating a bright-line rule eviscerating the free 
speech rights of employees. The decision led to a “sea change in public 
employee First Amendment jurisprudence.”12 It also led to a terrible 
phenomenon of eponymous infamy, as plaintiff’s attorneys commonly refer 
to their public employee clients who have been “Garcettized.”13 Today, the 
Garcetti decision continues to wreak havoc on countless public employees 
across the country.14 
Part II of this essay briefly discusses the pre-Garcetti landscape of 
public-employee-related First Amendment jurisprudence, with a focus on 
the Court’s, now defunct, balancing test for addressing such complaints, 
followed by a discussion of Garcetti and its multiple dissents. Part III 
addresses several lower court decisions illustrating how Garcetti has led to 
unfair results and unnecessarily diminished the free speech rights of police 
officers, firefighters, public school teachers, and other public employees. 
Finally, part IV discusses two slight retreats from the broad categorical rule 
created in Garcetti. These retrenchments are important, but better still 
would be the abrogation of Garcetti itself.   
                                                           
10 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
11 Id. at 421. 
12 David L. Hudson, Jr., Commentary: Public-Employee Speech and the Garcetti Effect, 
GETLEGAL (Sept. 28, 2009), https://www.getlegal.com/legal-info-center/commentary-public-
employee-speech-and-the-garcetti-effect/ [https://perma.cc/HR7P-UXHZ]. 
13 David L. Hudson, Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment Doesn’t Always 
Protect Government Workers, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2017, 4:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/public_employees_private_speech 
[https://perma.cc/85PC-WE8S]; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Garcettized! ’06 Ruling Still 
Zapping Speech, FREEDOM F. INST. (Jan. 15, 2010), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2010/01/15/garcettized-06-ruling-still-zapping-
speech/ [https://perma.cc/DA2F-KG9A]. 
14 David L. Hudson, Jr., No Free Speech for You, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08/anthony-kennedy-has-the-chance-to-undo-his-
worst-first-amendment-decision.html [https://perma.cc/PR44-JS6Q]; David L. Hudson, Jr., 
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II. GARCETTI FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH LAW 
 Historically, public employees possessed no free speech rights on 
the job. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then with the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, captured this reality when he wrote, “petitioner may have 
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be 
a policeman.”15 At its core, the Court held that public employees willingly 
relinquished their free speech rights when they accepted employment with 
the government.16 
 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the unfairness of this 
approach in the 1960s, reasoning that public employees had the right to 
speak out on matters of public concern or importance.17 In Pickering v. 
Board of Education, the Court ruled that a public school teacher had a free-
speech right to criticize the school board over its allocation of money 
between academics and athletics.18 The school board had fired science 
teacher Marvin Pickering after he wrote a letter to the editor of his local 
newspaper criticizing the school board’s elevation of athletic interests over 
academics.19 The Court explained, “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at 
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”20 
 The Court reasoned that Pickering’s letter was a matter of public 
importance to the community and that his comments did not harm the 
“close working relationships” he had at the school with his fellow teachers 
and administrators.21 In other words, Pickering’s speech did not negatively 
impact his fellow teachers, his students, or the principals. Rather, he 
criticized only the school board. 
Notably, the Court emphasized that public employees are often 
best positioned to offer keen insight into the operation of public 
institutions.22 Marvin Pickering had such insight. As a public-school teacher, 
he was uniquely situated to understand how the school board spent money 
                                                           
15 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892). 
16 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (“Congress and 
the President are responsible for an efficient public service. If, in their judgment, efficiency 
may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics as 
party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection.”). 
17 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
18 Id. at 574. 
19 Id. at 566. 
20 Id. at 568. 
21 Id. at 570. 
22 Id. at 572. 
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on academics and athletics. That speech was valuable to his community 
because taxpayer dollars were potentially mismanaged. 
 The Court later refined its balancing test in Connick v. Myers, a 
case involving an assistant district attorney who was fired after circulating a 
questionnaire in his workplace challenging office practices.23 Even though 
one of the questions touched on matters of public importance, the Court 
determined that Myers’s questionnaire negatively impacted the operation of 
the District Attorney’s Office.24 The Court wrote: “When close working 
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree 
of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”25 
 Thus, the Court created a balancing test, known as the “Pickering-
Connick test,” which dominated public employee free speech jurisprudence 
for decades.26  Under this approach, the Court first asked whether the 
employee spoke on a matter of public concern or whether the employee 
merely engaged in a personal grievance.27 If the speech was merely a private 
grievance, then no First Amendment protections attached.28 Alternatively, if 
the speech touched on a matter of public concern, the Court balanced the 
employee’s right to engage in such speech against the employer’s interest in 
an efficient, disruption-free workplace.29 
 This standard changed when Los Angeles Assistant District 
Attorney Richard Ceballos ran afoul of his superiors. Ceballos wrote a 
memorandum to his bosses recommending dismissal of criminal charges in 
a case regarding perjured law enforcement testimony.30 Ceballos believed a 
sheriff’s deputy had given false testimony in a search warrant affidavit.31 
Ceballos wrote the memo and later testified for the defense as to the viability 
of the warrant.32 As a result, his superiors stripped him of supervisory duties 
and transferred him to a less desirable work location.33 
                                                           
23 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
24 Id. at 151–52. 
25 Id. 
26 Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se 
Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech 
Partition, 8 J.L. SOCIETY 45, 54 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court had a balancing test 
in place for four decades prior to Garcetti).   
27 No Free Speech for You, supra note 14. 
28 Id. 
29 See First Amendment Protections on Public College and University Campuses: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. and Civ. Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. 4 (2017) (written testimony of David L. Hudson, Jr., Ombudsman, Newseum Inst. 
First Amendment Ctr.). 
30 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 414–15. 
33 Id. at 415. 
5
Hudson: The Supreme Court’s Worst Decision in Recent Years – Garcetti v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
380 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
 Ceballos sued in federal court, alleging his work transfer was 
retaliation against protected speech. The federal district court ruled in favor 
of the government, finding Ceballos had no First Amendment protection in 
his work memo.34 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 
“Ceballos’s allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constituted 
protected speech under the First Amendment.”35 The appeals court first 
noted that Ceballos’s speech, contained in the memo, was inherently a 
matter of public concern.36 The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to apply the 
Pickering-Connick balancing test and found in favor of Ceballos, noting that 
his memo did not cause any disruption in the workplace.37 
 The government appealed to the Supreme Court, and the case 
was actually argued twice before the Court.38 Initially, the Court appeared 
sharply divided and, by late Justice John Paul Stevens’ account, leaning 
toward a 5-4 decision in favor of Ceballos.39 But the Court’s composition 
changed when Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. replaced retiring Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor.40 Without O’Connor, the Court faced the prospect of a 4-
4 split.41 The Alito-O’Connor change required the Court to hear oral 
arguments again, and the Court ruled in favor of the District Attorney’s 
Office.42 
 Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, noted that the 
Court should not “constitutionalize the employee grievance.”43 The Court 
emphasized that Ceballos’s job required he write the memo in question.44 
Most importantly, Kennedy created a new threshold categorical rule: “We 
hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
                                                           
34 Ceballos v. Garcetti, CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
30, 2002). 
35 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004). 
36 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416. 
37 Id. (citing Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1180). 
38 Jessica Reed, From Pickering to Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee Free 
Speech Doctrine, 11 CUNY L. REV. 95, 97 n.16 (2007). 
39 JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS ON MY FIRST 94 
YEARS 456 (2019) (“Astute observers of the Court correctly inferred that Sandra had 
provided the decisive vote for the opposite result in all three before she retired. Otherwise 
there would have been no need to reargue any of them.”). 
40 See Lyle Denniston, Court to Rehear Public Employee Speech Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 
17, 2006, 12:22 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2006/02/court-to-rehear-public-
employee-speech-case/ [https://perma.cc/A6BD-SJAA]. 
41 Id. 
42 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410. 
43 Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)). 
44 Id. at 421. 
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purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.”45 
 Justice Kennedy also explained that “[r]estricting speech that owes 
its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”46 
He emphasized that public employee supervisors must be able to ensure 
their employees’ official communications are “accurate, demonstrate sound 
judgment, and promote the employer’s mission.”47 Kennedy even invoked 
the constitutional principles of federalism and separation of powers to justify 
the rule, explaining how “judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations” could threaten these seminal constitutional 
principles.48 
 Three Justices—John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen 
Breyer—authored separate dissents. Justice Stevens described the all-or-
nothing, wholly citizen speech or entirely employee speech, majority 
approach as “quite wrong,” noting, “it seems perverse to fashion a new rule 
that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly 
before talking frankly to their superiors.”49 In a lengthier dissent, Justice 
Souter proposed a modified Pickering-Connick test.50 In rejecting the 
categorical exclusion created by Garcetti, Souter argued:  
[P]rivate and public interests in addressing official 
wrongdoing and threats to health and safety can outweigh 
the government’s stake in the efficient implementation of 
policy, and when they do, public employees who speak on 
these matters in the course of their duties should be eligible 
to claim First Amendment protection.51 
For his part, Justice Breyer emphasized that Ceballos, as a prosecutor, had 
professional obligations to voice his concerns about potentially perjured law 
enforcement testimony.52 For Justice Breyer, these “professional and special 
constitutional obligations” counseled in favor of protecting such employee 
speech.53 
 Many legal commentators questioned the Garcetti decision from 
the outset.54 Sheldon Nahmod wrote, “Garcetti is unsound as a matter of 
                                                           
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 412. 
47 Id. at 422–23. 
48 Id. at 423. 
49 Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 427–44 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 447 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. 
54 Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal 
Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 117 (2008) (“Through its holding, the Court has 
7
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First Amendment policy because it under-protects public employee speech 
that is vital to self-government.”55 Professor Helen Norton, a leading expert 
on government speech, criticized the Garcetti decision, writing: “Lower 
courts now routinely apply Garcetti’s expedited review to dispose of 
government workers’ First Amendment claims at great cost to the public’s 
interest in government transparency, precisely the value that the government 
speech doctrine supposedly protects.”56 
III. EGREGIOUS EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES BEING 
“GARCETTIZED” 
The Garcetti decision spread through the defense bar like greased 
lightning and led to a significant reduction in free speech protections for 
countless public employees. A few of the notable casualties follow. 
A. Speech about Rank Corruption in Law Enforcement Not Protected 
Speech  
Perhaps the starkest example of Garcetti’s unfairness concerns 
former Illinois State Police Officer Michale Callahan, a courageous law 
enforcement official who faced retaliation after exposing the innocence of 
two men on death row and the corruption of his superior officers.57 In the 
spring of 2000, the Illinois State Police (ISP) received a letter from a private 
investigator asking the agency to review the 1986 murders of Dyke and 
Karen Rhoads.58 The ISP assigned the matter to Lt. Callahan.59 His 
investigation uncovered a strong likelihood that the men convicted of the 
Rhoads’ murders—Herbert Whitlock and Randy Steidl—were, in fact, 
innocent.60 Callahan and his captain, Steven Fermon, presented their 
                                                           
now made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out in the best 
interests of the public without jeopardizing their career.”); Beth Ann Roesler, Garcetti v. 
Ceballos: Judicially Muzzling the Voices of Public Sector Employees, 53 S.D. L. REV. 397, 
397 (2008) (noting how Garcetti “unduly expanded the powers of the government employer 
at the expense of its employees and the general public”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tending to 
Potted Plants: The Professional Identity Vacuum in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 NEV. L.J. 703, 
708 (2013) (explaining “Garcetti is poorly reasoned as a matter of First Amendment 
doctrine”); Margaret Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed Attorney, 
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2175, 2178 (2010) (noting Garcetti is “particularly troubling as applied 
to publicly employed attorney speech”). 
55 Sheldon Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique 
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008). 
56 HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2019).   
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findings at the ISP Academy, arguing that the governor of Illinois should 
grant clemency to both Whitlock and Steidl.61 
Callahan soon became suspicious that Robert Morgan, a person of 
interest in the initial investigation, was involved in the murders.62 Callahan 
also suspected Cpt. Fermon had deliberately compromised the Morgan 
investigation.63 After Callahan learned Morgan was under federal 
investigation for possible drug trafficking and money laundering,64 he 
relayed these suspicions to his commander, Diane Carper.65 Carper ordered 
him to stop investigating the Rhoads murders.66 
In April 2003, Callahan filed a complaint with the Department of 
Internal Investigations (DII), claiming Cpt. Fermon’s potential involvement 
with organized crime had interfered with a federal criminal investigation.67 
The tension between Callahan and his captain became tangible. Around the 
time Callahan filed his DII complaints, the ISP’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity Office began investigating a hostile-work-environment 
complaint related to his and Fermon’s interactions.68 Soon after, Carper 
transferred Callahan to a patrol position in another district.69  
Callahan sued in federal district court, alleging retaliation for his 
speech exposing Cpt. Fermon’s corruption and for other statements related 
to the Rhoads investigation.70 A federal jury awarded Callahan $210,000 in 
compensatory damages and more than $480,000 in punitive damages.71 The 
federal district court judge reduced the punitive damages to $150,000.72 
The defendants, including Cpt. Fermon, appealed.73 During the 
pendency of the appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti.74 On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied Garcetti’s categorical rule and 
determined Callahan’s speech to the ISP Academy, as well as his criticisms 
of his superiors, was official job-related speech.75 The Seventh Circuit noted 
that lieutenants regularly make formal speeches at the ISP Academy as part 
                                                           
61 Id. at 1042–43. 
62 Id. at 1042. 
63 Id. at 1043. 
64 Id. at 1042. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1042–43. 







74 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Callahan, 526 F.3d at 1040 (stating the original 
case was filed September 23, 2003). 
75 Callahan, 526 F.3d at 1045. 
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of their job duties.76 The appeals court also found Callahan “spoke pursuant 
to his official duties when he twice complained to the DII about Cpt. 
Fermon and Cdr. Carter.”77 The Seventh Circuit noted that ISP rules 
require officers to report incidents of misconduct by fellow officers.78 
In his memoir, Callahan railed against the unfairness of the Garcetti 
ruling, stating, “How ludicrous, I always thought I was a citizen when I spoke 
up, and I certainly didn’t realize that once I put my gun and badge on, I 
stopped being a citizen[.]”79 He also noted that several members of his 
federal jury called his lawyer to complain about the inequity of the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision and the political corruption endured by Callahan.80 
B. Revealing a Leak in Law Enforcement Leads to Punishment Not 
Praise 
 Like Callahan, Martin Sigsworth knows full well the phenomenon 
of being “Garcettized” after revealing corruption in law enforcement. 
Sigsworth, an investigator for the Aurora, Illinois Police Department, 
worked on a multi-jurisdictional task force designed to address gang activity 
in the area.81 Joining the department in 1992, Sigsworth later began working 
with federal agencies to combat gang and drug activity in Aurora.82 In 2002, 
the task force obtained numerous arrest warrants for suspected drug dealers 
and gang leaders.83 
 Before the task force could move on the stash houses associated 
with the targets, some of the task force seemingly gave the targets notice of 
the impending raid.84 As a result, several key individuals evaded arrest.85 
Sigsworth reported to his Chief of Police that several task force members 
likely committed misconduct that led to the botched raid.86 Shortly 
thereafter, the department removed Sigsworth from the task force and the 
resulting investigation.87 
                                                           
76 Id. (noting lieutenants were regularly required to attend meetings and exchange information 
at the Academy and that Callahan was required to appear during business hours and report 
on activities he had been paid to perform). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 355. 
80 Id. at 356. 
81 Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 507 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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 Sigsworth filed a federal lawsuit, alleging retaliation based on his 
protected speech regarding possible corruption in the task force.88 A federal 
district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Sigsworth spoke as an 
employee rather than as a citizen.89 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s ruling against Sigsworth.90 
 On appeal, Sigsworth argued that his speech should be protected 
because it “constituted matters of the utmost concern to the public.”91 
However, the Seventh Circuit again relied on the categorical rule in Garcetti, 
effectively barring Sigsworth’s claim.92 The appeals court wrote: “Sigsworth 
was not speaking as a citizen when he reported to his superiors his 
suspicions of misconduct by his colleagues.”93 The Seventh Circuit 
conceded Sigsworth did what any member of the task force should have 
done when he discovered his colleague’s misconduct—that is, he reported 
the wrongdoing.94 However, the court concluded, “Sigsworth’s report to his 
supervisors of the suspected misconduct was part of his official duties as an 
investigator and member of the task force and, therefore, outside the scope 
of First Amendment protection.”95 
C. Fire Chief’s Revelations about Inadequate Staffing Lead to 
Termination  
 The tale of Charles D. Foley, Jr. offers another egregious example 
of a public servant who spoke the truth and paid the price following 
Garcetti.96 Foley served as Chief of the Fire Department for Randolph, 
Massachusetts.97 In May 2007, the fire department responded to a fire at a 
single-family residence in the town.98 “[T]wo children, ages seventeen and 
ten, [perished in the fire, as they] were trapped in a second floor 
bedroom.”99 
                                                           
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 512. 
91 Id. at 509. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 510. 
94 Id. at 511 (“Sigsworth’s allegations indicate that in reporting his suspicions, he was merely 
doing what was expected of him as a member of the task force.”). 
95 Id. at 512. 
96 Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that the chief “was 
speaking in his official capacity and not as a citizen” when he made the statements, and the 
statements were therefore not protected by the First Amendment). 




Hudson: The Supreme Court’s Worst Decision in Recent Years – Garcetti v.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
386 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
 At the scene of the fatal fire, Foley, the state fire marshal, and 
another employee from the fire marshal’s office spoke to the media.100 Foley 
was in uniform at the time of his press conference, and he “spoke about the 
details of the fire,” but also mentioned concerns about insufficient funding 
and personnel at the fire department.101 He indicated that allowing more 
manpower would have made the firefighting process “more professional[] 
and more according to standard.”102 He also stated: “I’ve been asking to 
replace the fire fighters here in the Town over the last five years and it seems 
to have fallen on deaf ears.”103 Further, Foley told the press: “As many of 
you are here today, you have the resources to bring this information to the 
public.”104 
 Town leaders who were upset that Foley spoke candidly to the 
media105 brought disciplinary charges against him, claiming he used poor 
judgment in speaking to the press about alleged deficiencies in fire 
protection services.106 During these proceedings, a town-appointed hearing 
officer determined Foley made “inappropriate, inaccurate, intemperate, 
and misleading statements to the news media” and recommended a fifteen-
day suspension, which the Town’s Board of Selectmen upheld.107 
 Foley filed a lawsuit in federal district court, alleging a violation of 
his First Amendment rights and several state law claims based on his use of 
protected speech.108 The court noted that Foley’s employment contract 
neither authorized nor required he make public statements as part of his 
job duties but added that “nothing in the contract or the statute prohibited 
Foley from doing so.”109 Proceeding along these lines, the federal district 
court found that the statements were “made pursuant to [Foley]’s official job 
duties” and granted summary judgment in the town’s favor.110 On appeal, 
the First Circuit affirmed.111 In so doing, the court held that the issue of 
whether or not Foley was required to speak to the media as part of his 
official duties was not dispositive in the matter.112 Rather, the court of appeals 
                                                           
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 2–3. 
102 Id. at 3. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 3–4. 




110 Foley v. Town of Randolph, 601 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (D. Mass. 2009). 
111 Foley, 598 F.3d at 1. 
112 Id. at 6. 
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emphasized how Foley chose to speak to the news media while he was on 
duty and in uniform.113 
 The appeals court explained: “As Chief, he had been in 
command of the scene, and when choosing to speak to the press, he would 
naturally be regarded as the public face of the Department when speaking 
about matters involving the Department.”114 The First Circuit decision 
emphasized that there was no relevant citizen analogue to his speech.115 
Rather, he spoke as the fire chief at a forum that he had access to solely 
because of his position.116 The court noted “the subject of Foley’s speech 
was entirely related to matters concerning the Fire Department,”117 and 
added, “there could be no doubt that Foley was speaking in his official 
capacity and not as a citizen.”118 Finally, the First Circuit concluded: “We 
hold that when the circumstances surrounding a government employee’s 
speech indicate that the employee is speaking in his official capacity, 
Garcetti dictates that we strike the balance in favor of the government 
employer.”119 
D. Teacher’s Warning of Scabies Outbreak Not Protected Speech  
 Yvonne Massaro, an art teacher at Edward Murrow High School 
in New York City, was also “Garcettized.”120 In December 2005, Massaro 
informed school officials that she had contracted scabies, which she 
believed was caused by the unsanitary conditions in her classroom.121 She 
submitted several documents to the New York Department of Education, 
including an injury report and an accident report.122 The injury report 
revealed that she had been bitten by mites in her classroom.123 The report 
also revealed what Massaro called “an unclean working environment.”124 
Additionally, she expressed concern about the school’s failure to clean her 
classroom or move her to a different classroom.125 Massaro complained 
about these issues several times to school administrators.126 
                                                           
113 Id. at 7. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 7. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 8. 
118 Id. at 9. 
119 Id. at 9–10. 
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 After her complaints, Massaro alleged school officials changed 
her schedule unfavorably and canceled one of her classes.127 She filed a 
federal lawsuit, contending officials retaliated against her for her use of 
protected speech.128 A federal district court granted summary judgment to 
the Department of Education, reasoning that Massaro spoke as an 
employee, rather than as a citizen, when she made the complaints.129 
 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.130 The Second Circuit held that Massaro made her 
statements “as a public school teacher” within the meaning of the Garcetti 
standard.131 The appeals court concluded: “We have no difficulty in 
concluding on this record that Massaro spoke as an employee—not as a 
private citizen.”132 
 
E. Teacher’s Complaints of Falsifying Test Results Not Protected Speech  
 Another public school teacher learned of Garcetti’s long reach 
when he contested his termination on First Amendment grounds.133 Bruno 
Mpoy, a special education teacher at Ludlow Elementary School with the 
Washington D.C. Teaching Fellows, alleged the school’s principal, Donald 
Presswood, instructed him to falsify his students’ test results.134 Mpoy further 
claimed that when he refused to falsify the test scores, Presswood enlisted 
other teachers to do so.135 Mpoy sent a letter to Michelle Rhee, Chancellor 
of the Washington D.C. School District, complaining about a lack of 
classroom supplies, inadequate classroom facilities, lack of teaching 
assistants, and the order from Principal Presswood to falsify test scores.136 
Two months later, Mpoy was terminated.137 
 Mpoy sued in federal court, alleging retaliation for speech 
protected by the First Amendment.138 The federal district court determined 
Mpoy’s complaints were “‘part-and-parcel’ of his concerns as a school 
teacher,” noting that the vast majority of the complaints related directly to 
Mpoy’s classroom.139 Mpoy contended he spoke as a public citizen when he 
                                                           
127 Id. at 654. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 654–56. 
130 Id. at 656. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Mpoy v. Fenty, 901 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147 (D.D.C. 2012). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 148. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 154–55. 
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raised the issue of the falsification of test scores.140 However, the federal 
district court reasoned that Mpoy’s complaints related to his responsibilities 
as a public school teacher and noted that Mpoy raised his complaints up the 
“chain of command” rather than outside it.141 The court concluded: 
“Although the Court is not unsympathetic to what Plaintiff alleges occurred 
here—indeed, his allegations are quite troubling, particularly in the realm of 
falsification of test scores—it nonetheless cannot find that [Mpoy] has alleged 
a violation of the First Amendment.”142 
F. Custodian’s Warning about Asbestos Not Protected Speech  
 Another Garcetti victim was a New York-based custodian who 
was fired after complaining about possible asbestos contamination at a 
public high school.143 Norman Morey worked for the Somers County School 
District for twenty years until his termination, with nine of those years spent 
as head custodian.144 “In May 2003, Morey received a phone call that there 
was a mess in the high school gymnasium” where he found “[g]rayish-white 
chunks and larger pieces of insulation . . . [that had] fallen from the 
ceiling.”145 
 Morey informed the Superintendent of Buildings and 
Transportation that the fallen material could contain asbestos and expressed 
his view about closing the gym pending a thorough evaluation.146 The 
Superintendent told Morey to simply tape up the loose insulation.147 Morey 
was told “not to be a troublemaker” and that “the administration ha[d] ways 
of dealing with troublemakers.”148 Later, administrators terminated Morey 
for allegedly submitting inaccurate timesheets and verbally abusing custodial 
staff.149 Morey sued, contending administrators terminated him in retaliation 
for his warnings about possible asbestos contamination at the high school.150 
 A federal district court judge dismissed Morey’s lawsuit based on 
Garcetti.151 The judge determined that the core duties of Morey’s job related 
to maintaining school buildings and grounds and concluded: “[I]t was clear 
that Morey was acting in furtherance of his core duty when he asserted that 
                                                           
140 Id. at 157. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Morey v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 06 Civ. 1877, 2010 WL 1047622, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 19, 2010). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 




150 Id. at *3. 
151 Id. at *8. 
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the fallen insulation materials in the gymnasium might contain asbestos and 
that the area should be tested to resolve the issue.”152 
These decisions are troubling and should alarm reasonable people 
who care about government transparency, the rule of law, and fundamental 
fairness. A law enforcement official who exposes corruption and a cover-up 
with regard to a cold case should not face retaliation like Michale Callahan.153 
A police officer who reveals a leak in a multi-jurisdictional task force like 
Martin Sigsworth should be commended, not chastised and relocated.154 
The public deserves to hear that a fire department may be underfunded and 
understaffed, as Charles Foley told his community in Randolph, 
Massachusetts.155 Quite simply, the public benefits from learning about 
problems in places of public employment because these places of 
employment often serve significant functions for society at large. It makes 
little sense to deprive the public of its best sources of information – that is, 
the employees who actually witness problems firsthand. 
IV. SLIGHT EXCEPTIONS TO GARCETTI 
 There have been two slight retreats from Garcetti in recent 
years.156 The first deals with First Amendment protection for public 
employees punished for truthful, in-court testimony when such testimony is 
not a regular aspect of their job duties.157 The second addresses some lower 
courts’ recognition that Garcetti should not apply with full force in university 
settings.158 
A. Protecting Truthful Testimony in Court  
The Supreme Court provided a small, welcome relief from Garcetti 
for public employees who do not normally testify in court but who have 
been punished for providing truthful sworn testimony under oath in Lane 
                                                           
152 Id. at *7. 
153 See Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1040 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a police 
officer’s statements are not protected by the first amendment when made at a meeting about 
a cold case, and Plaintiff was transferred laterally to another district). But see Fulk v. Vill. of 
Sandoval, No. 08-843-GPM, 2010 WL 1132560, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2010) (stating that 
because sufficient evidence existed relating to police officer’s off duty reports of suspected 
misconduct, the reports were protected under the first amendment). 
154 See Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect a police detective’s speech to supervisors). 
155 Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
156 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
157 See id. at 231. 
158 See Adams v. Tr. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 553 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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v. Franks.159 Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training 
for Youth (CITY) and was employed by Central Alabama Community 
College (CACC).160 Lane conducted an audit in response to CITY’s financial 
difficulties and uncovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State 
Representative on CITY’s payroll, had failed to report to her CITY office.161  
 Lane fired Schmitz after she refused to show up at her CITY 
office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation initiated an investigation into 
her employment with CITY.162 Lane later testified before a federal grand 
jury about his decision to fire Schmitz.163 In January 2008, the grand jury 
indicted Schmitz on four counts of mail fraud and four counts of theft.164 
Later, at Schmitz’s trial, Lane testified under subpoena as to the events that 
led to Schmitz’s termination.165 The jury failed to reach a verdict.166 
 Six months later, federal prosecutors re-tried Schmitz, and Lane 
testified again.167 This time, the jury convicted Schmitz of three counts of 
mail fraud and four counts of theft.168 Steve Franks, who became president 
of CACC, later terminated Lane.169 Lane sued in federal court, contending 
his termination resulted from his truthful courtroom testimony in the 
Schmitz matter.170 A federal district court granted summary judgment to 
Franks based on qualified immunity and Garcetti.171 Relying extensively on 
Garcetti, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no violation of clearly 
established law because Lane’s testimony related to his official job duties 
within the meaning of Garcetti.172 
 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, writing 
“[t]truthful testimony by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary 
job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.”173 The 
Court also explained, “Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a 
quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone 
who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to 
tell the truth.”174 The Court distinguished Lane from Garcetti, noting that 
                                                           
159 Lane, 573 U.S. at 231. 
160 Id. 









170 Id. at 234. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 238. 
174 Id. 
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Lane’s in-court testimony was different from an internal memorandum 
prepared by a deputy district attorney for his office.175 Furthermore, the 
Court emphasized that the key question under Garcetti is whether the 
speech in question is “ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s 
duties.”176 
 While the Court’s decision in Lane v. Franks is narrow and 
arguably does not apply to public employees who regularly testify in court 
as part of their jobs, the decision is still significant because it represents a 
slight retreat from Garcetti.177 The decision also reiterates the point Justice 
Thurgood Marshall made so forcefully in Pickering—that “speech by public 
employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special 
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of 
public concern through their employment.”178 
B. Garcetti in the University Setting 
 In Garcetti, Justices Kennedy and Souter sparred over whether 
the majority’s holding of no First Amendment protection for official, job-
related speech would apply to the expression of university professors and 
academic professionals.179 In his dissent, Souter warned that the holding 
would imperil university professors’ speech and academic freedom.180 
Souter noted the Supreme Court once referred to academic freedom as a 
“transcendent value to all of us”181 and that “[t]he vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.”182 
 Kennedy responded to Souter’s warnings, noting “[t]here is some 
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully 
accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”183 
However, Kennedy ultimately sidestepped the question as to whether the 
holding applies “in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
scholarship or teaching.”184 
                                                           
175 Id. at 239. 
176 Id. at 240. 
177 David L. Hudson, Jr., Court Limits Garcetti – at Least a Little, FREEDOM F. INST. (July 8, 
2014), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2014/07/08/court-limits-garcetti-at-least-a-
little/ [https://perma.cc/X3KW-MFF5]. 
178 Lane, 573 U.S. at 240. 
179 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
180 Id. at 438 (J. Souter, dissenting). 
181 Id. at 439 (J. Souter, dissenting) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
182 Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
183 Id. at 425 (majority opinion). 
184 Id. 
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 Only two federal appellate circuits, the Fourth and the Ninth, 
have ruled Garcetti does not apply in university settings.185 The Fourth 
Circuit first rejected Garcetti in the university setting in the case of Michael 
Adams, an associate professor of criminology at the University of North 
Carolina Wilmington.186 Adams alleged university officials denied him a 
promotion to full professor because of the conservative Christian viewpoints 
reflected in his columns and books.187 A federal district court denied his 
claims, in part based on Garcetti.188 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reinstated 
Adams’s First Amendment claims.189 The court explained: “We are also 
persuaded that Garcetti would not apply in the academic context of a public 
university as represented by the facts of this case” because doing so “could 
place beyond the reach of First Amendment protection many forms of 
public speech or service a professor engaged in during his employment.”190 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the use of Garcetti in an academic 
setting in the case of David Demers, a tenured associate professor at 
Washington State University.191 Demers claimed university officials 
retaliated against him by lowering his evaluation scores because of a 
pamphlet called “The 7 Step Plan” and his book entitled The Ivory Tower 
of Babel.192  
  A federal district court granted summary judgment to the 
university administrators.193 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting 
“Demers presents the kind of case that worried Justice Souter.”194 The Ninth 
Circuit determined “Garcetti does not—indeed, consistent with the First 
Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writing that are 
performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.”195 
                                                           
185 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Are Free Speech and Academic Freedom Under Assault at 
Colleges and Universities? AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Oct. 1, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/free_speech_academic_freedom_buchanan 
[https://perma.cc/VS5V-ETWV]. 
186 Adams v. Tr. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). 
187 Id. at 557. 
188 Id. at 561 (explaining the district court held Adams’s listing of his written work and public 
appearances in a promotional application was speech made pursuant to his official duties 
and therefore not protected by the First Amendment). 
189 Id. at 562 (finding the district court’s conclusion that Adams’s speech was converted from 
protected to unprotected to be erroneous). 
190 Id. at 562–64. 
191 Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014). 
192 Id. at 406–08. Both the book, a draft of which was attached to Demers’s 2007 sabbatical 
application, and the pamphlet, which Demers distributed widely, were critical of Washington 
State University administrators. Id. 
193 Id. at 409 (holding that Demers’s publications were written and distributed as part of his 
official duties as faculty member, and, therefore, were not protected speech). 
194 Id. at 411. 
195 Id. at 412. 
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Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that cases involving academic freedom and 
scholarship at the university level are best resolved using the traditional 
Pickering-Connick balancing test.196 
 Other circuits have not embraced this approach.197 For example, 
the Second Circuit recently ruled Garcetti foreclosed First Amendment 
claims brought by a university adjunct professor who alleged he was not re-
hired after he reported students cheating.198 
 Hopefully, the Supreme Court will clarify that Garcetti does not 
apply to teaching and scholarship at some point.199 Academic freedom, 
scholarship, and teaching need the freedom to flourish.200 Workplace 
efficiency should not trump the ability of university professors to conduct 
inquiry and question societal trends. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos has had tragic results for 
countless public employees across the country.201 It also represents a 
significant “blot” on the First Amendment record of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy.202 As a direct result of Garcetti, many public employees keep their 
mouths shut for fear of losing their jobs. The losers are not just individual 
employees who get “Garcettized.” Rather it is the public at large, which is 
deprived of important information pertaining to their tax dollars and the 
administration of public programs, that is harmed. Garcetti understates the 
importance of public employees’ speech to the public discourse writ large 
and fails to consider the public’s First Amendment rights to information 
about the functioning of their public institutions. Garcetti causes palpable 
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198 See David L. Hudson, Jr., No First Amendment Protection for Professor Who Spoke Out 
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harm not just to the individual employees, whose free-speech rights it 
squelches, but to the interested public as well.203  
 The Supreme Court made a major misstep by erecting such a 
broad, categorical rule in Garcetti v. Ceballos. The decision is a 
“jurisprudential disaster,”204 and one of the worst decisions rendered by the 
Court in recent memory. It unnecessarily and needlessly reduces and 
disrespects the free-speech rights of tens of millions of people. 
                                                           
203 No Free Speech for You, supra note 14. 
204 Id. 
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